Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Monday, May 27, 2013
Saturday, May 25, 2013
Saturday, May 18, 2013
Sunday Talk Show Lineup May 19, 2013
• Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
• White House senior adviser Dan Pfeiffer
• Rep. Dave Camp (R-Mich.), chairman, House Ways and Means Committee• Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.), chairman, House Democratic Caucus
• Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
“This Week” on ABC
• White House senior adviser Dan Pfeiffer
• Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
• Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio)
• Rep. Tom Price (R-Ga.)
• Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.)
“Face the Nation” on CBS
• White House senior adviser Dan Pfeiffer
• Senate Minority Whip John Cornyn (R-Texas)
• Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah)
• Associated Press President and CEO Gary Pruitt
“State of the Union” on CNN
• White House senior adviser Dan Pfeiffer
• Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.)
• Democratic strategist Donna Brazile
• Republican strategist Ana Navarro
“Fox News Sunday” on Fox
• White House senior adviser Dan Pfeiffer
• Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), chairman, House Budget Committee
• Former Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio)
• Former Bush adviser Karl Rove
Saturday, May 11, 2013
Redlines and the Problems of Intervention in Syria is republished with permission of Stratfor.
By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman
The civil war in Syria, one of the few lasting legacies of the Arab Spring, has been under way for more than two years. There has been substantial outside intervention in the war. The Iranians in particular, and the Russians to a lesser extent, have supported the Alawites under Bashar al Assad. The Saudis and some of the Gulf States have supported the Sunni insurgents in various ways. The Americans, Europeans and Israelis, however, have for the most part avoided involvement.
Last week the possibility of intervention increased. The Americans and Europeans have had no appetite for intervention after their experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. At the same time, they have not wanted to be in a position where intervention was simply ruled out. Therefore, they identified a redline that, if crossed, would force them to reconsider intervention: the use of chemical weapons.
There were two reasons for this particular boundary. The first was that the United States and European states have a systemic aversion to the possession and usage of weapons of mass destruction in other countries. They see this ultimately as a threat to them, particularly if such weapons are in the hands of non-state users. But there was a more particular reason in Syria. No one thought that al Assad was reckless enough to use chemical weapons because they felt that his entire strategy depended on avoiding U.S. and European intervention, and that therefore he would never cross the redline. This was comforting to the Americans and Europeans because it allowed them to appear decisive while avoiding the risk of having to do anything.
However, in recent weeks, first the United Kingdom and France and then Israel and the United States asserted that the al Assad regime had used chemical weapons. No one could point to an incidence of massive deaths in Syria, and the evidence of usage was vague enough that no one was required to act immediately.
In Iraq, it turned out there was not a nuclear program or the clandestine chemical and biological weapons programs that intelligence had indicated. Had there been, the U.S. invasion might have had more international support, but it is doubtful it would have had a better outcome. The United States would have still forced the Sunnis into a desperate position, the Iranians would have still supported Shiite militias and the Kurds would have still tried to use the chaos to build an autonomous Kurdish region. The conflict would have still been fought and its final outcome would not have looked very different from how it does now.
What the United States learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya is that it is relatively easy for a conventional force to destroy a government. It is much harder -- if not impossible -- to use the same force to impose a new type of government. The government that follows might be in some moral sense better than what preceded it -- it is difficult to imagine a more vile regime than Saddam Hussein's -- but the regime that replaces it will first be called chaos, followed by another regime that survives to the extent that it holds the United States at arm's length. Therefore, redline or not, few want to get involved in another intervention pivoting on weapons of mass destruction.
The situation is different today.
Founder and Chairman
The civil war in Syria, one of the few lasting legacies of the Arab Spring, has been under way for more than two years. There has been substantial outside intervention in the war. The Iranians in particular, and the Russians to a lesser extent, have supported the Alawites under Bashar al Assad. The Saudis and some of the Gulf States have supported the Sunni insurgents in various ways. The Americans, Europeans and Israelis, however, have for the most part avoided involvement.
Last week the possibility of intervention increased. The Americans and Europeans have had no appetite for intervention after their experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. At the same time, they have not wanted to be in a position where intervention was simply ruled out. Therefore, they identified a redline that, if crossed, would force them to reconsider intervention: the use of chemical weapons.
There were two reasons for this particular boundary. The first was that the United States and European states have a systemic aversion to the possession and usage of weapons of mass destruction in other countries. They see this ultimately as a threat to them, particularly if such weapons are in the hands of non-state users. But there was a more particular reason in Syria. No one thought that al Assad was reckless enough to use chemical weapons because they felt that his entire strategy depended on avoiding U.S. and European intervention, and that therefore he would never cross the redline. This was comforting to the Americans and Europeans because it allowed them to appear decisive while avoiding the risk of having to do anything.
However, in recent weeks, first the United Kingdom and France and then Israel and the United States asserted that the al Assad regime had used chemical weapons. No one could point to an incidence of massive deaths in Syria, and the evidence of usage was vague enough that no one was required to act immediately.
In Iraq, it turned out there was not a nuclear program or the clandestine chemical and biological weapons programs that intelligence had indicated. Had there been, the U.S. invasion might have had more international support, but it is doubtful it would have had a better outcome. The United States would have still forced the Sunnis into a desperate position, the Iranians would have still supported Shiite militias and the Kurds would have still tried to use the chaos to build an autonomous Kurdish region. The conflict would have still been fought and its final outcome would not have looked very different from how it does now.
What the United States learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya is that it is relatively easy for a conventional force to destroy a government. It is much harder -- if not impossible -- to use the same force to impose a new type of government. The government that follows might be in some moral sense better than what preceded it -- it is difficult to imagine a more vile regime than Saddam Hussein's -- but the regime that replaces it will first be called chaos, followed by another regime that survives to the extent that it holds the United States at arm's length. Therefore, redline or not, few want to get involved in another intervention pivoting on weapons of mass destruction.
Interventionist Arguments and Illusions
However, there are those who want to intervene for moral reasons. In Syria, there is the same moral issue that there was in Iraq. The existing regime is corrupt and vicious. It should not be forgotten that the al Assad regime conducted a massacre in the city of Hama in 1982 in which tens of thousands of Sunnis were killed for opposing the regime. The regime carried out constant violations of human rights and endless brutality. There was nothing new in this, and the world was able to act fairly indifferent to the events, since it was still possible to create media blackouts in those days. Syria's patron, the Soviet Union, protected it, and challenging the Syrian regime would be a challenge to the Soviet Union. It was a fight that few wanted to wage because the risks were seen as too high.The situation is different today.
Sunday Talk Show Lineup May 12, 2013
• Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), chairman, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
• Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman, Senate Intelligence Committee
• Former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-chairman, State Department Accountability Review Board on Benghazi• Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.)
“This Week” on ABC
• Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)
• Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.)
• Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Retired Gen. James Cartwright
• Democratic strategist Donna Brazile
• Former Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine)
• Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.)
• Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R-Wash.)
• Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.)
• Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.)
“Face the Nation” on CBS
• Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates
• Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.)
• Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.)
• Former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-chairman, State Department Accountability Review Board on Benghazi
“State of the Union” on CNN
• Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine)
• Rep. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.)
• Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii)
• Republican strategist Alex Castellanos
• Democratic consultant Mo Elleithee
“Fox News Sunday” on Fox
• Rep.-elect Mark Sanford (R-S.C.)
• Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman, House Intelligence Committee
• Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), ranking member, House Armed Services Committee
• Former Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio)
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